By: Naveed H. Sandeelo

We know that the word hermeneutics emerged in the seventeenth century and simply is defined as the art or science of interpretation. It is also considered as an embryonic universal hermeneutics thought we find some rationalist lines were connected with it. Until the end of the nineteenth century, it was just a theory based on rules which governed the discipline of interpretation. It served only the aim of normative. Hermeneutics limited itself to gaining methodological directions to the specifically interpretive sciences. Being unknown to the outer world it continuously remained within the limits of established disciplines and was only concerned with the interpretation of texts. Later on, in the Renaissance movement, we see the formation of theoretical hermeneutics and the philosophical hermeneutics which legged behind the simple idea of the art of interpretation which was essentially connected with the patristic period.

  The term philosophical hermeneutics is the development of very recent times and this refers to the philosophical position of Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer. Although we see that Schleiermacher, Droysen, and Dilthey much contributed regarding hermeneutic problems but they did not take efforts enough the work to its completion they initiated primarily. Even in the case of Gadamer we see that his efforts would have been impossible without Heidegger. While observing Gadamer’s endeavors and contributions in hermeneutics Heidegger with enough enthusiasm expressed these words that, “hermeneutic philosophy is the business of Gadamer.” In this sense, we can say Gadamer’s contributions in the development of philosophical hermeneutics are praiseworthy who really advanced hermeneutics and brought innovations in it. Therefore, we may say that this new hermeneutics distinguishes Gadamer from preceding philosophers’ contributions. Including this, we may not still hesitate to say that he also radicalized it more and his overviews influenced it enough. Though we see in Heidegger located hermeneutic inquiry on the more fundamental grounds of human facticity he refused to bring out in publication form. These were germinal hermeneutic ideas by which people of his time were much impressed and fascinated enough. This was overshadowed due to his other concerns. He is Gadamer who endeavored to reformulate universal hermeneutics as a theory of our experiences’ unavoidable historicity and linguistically.

  While examining closely Gadamer’s concept of a hermeneutics we find in him the similarity accords with the sense more closely to the hermeneutics of facticity introduced earlier by his teacher Heidegger. Hence Gadamer has intellectually discussed his own hermeneutics in his Magnus opus “Truth and Method”.  We perceive by Gadamer’s achievements have shown us that the historicity of being related to understanding our historically situated consciousness and the human sciences in which that consciousness expresses itself. Gadamer being as a student of Heidegger has developed the implications of what Heidegger contributed to hermeneutics into his Philosophical Hermeneutics and Truth and Method which are systematically extended essential works in the concerned field of hermeneutics. Through these works professor, Gadamer has traced the hermeneutics’ development in a detailed form where he has provided the first historical accounts of hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to William Dilthy and Heidegger. In Gadamer, we see the position of hermeneutics is one step ahead into the linguistic phase where we read him this assertion that being that can be understood in language. Thus through language, we find hermeneutics is an encounter with being. Ultimately he insists on the human reality’s linguistic character, and hermeneutics is seen surrounded by the philosophical questions of the connection of language with being. He considers language as an essential and basic mode of operation of our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the constitution of the world. Hence they pronounced the sciences considering fix and nonverbal to them. He took its task for reconnecting the objective world of technology with basic orders of our being which he believed merely demand our respect. He says it is our task to transcend the prejudices that underlie the historical consciousness, aesthetic consciousness, and historical consciousness.

  Gadamer’s efforts were to introduce human sciences in the place of natural sciences. He considered natural sciences such as mathematics as insufficient. He emphasized this idea that the problem of hermeneutics goes beyond the limits of the concept of method set by modern science. Contrary to science he clearly says that understanding and interpretation of texts is the concern of human experience. For him, the hermeneutic phenomenon is not a problem of method but it is concerned with knowledge and truth. In this way, he strongly insisted on this idea that in the domain of understanding not only do we understand texts but along with them we acquire insights and know the truths. For the development of hermeneutics Gadamer has not attempted to introduce a methodology of the human sciences, but he attempted to understand the human sciences in a true sense with the totality of our experience of the world. His aim was not introducing any kind of technique or art of understanding as we see theological and traditional literary hermeneutics attempted sought to be. Gadamer implores on the losing of that naïve innocence with which, for him, traditional concepts were made to save one’s own thinking. Further, regarding this, he was of the opinion that since that time science’s attitude towards these concepts has turned to be strangely detached, it treats them as tools. Therefore he did not remotely wish to deny the need for methodology within the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). Nor did he suggest anything for serving the ancient dispute on the method between the human sciences and the natural sciences. We see him skipping over the debate about the methodological uniqueness of the human sciences by which neo-Kantianism, as well as Dilthy, Misch, Rothaker, and Weber, was strongly occupied at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Hence, he saw moral preaching under the guise of science as absurd. And concurring with Helmholtz, while doing justice to the human sciences who insisted memory and talked of the psychological tact, Gadamer thinks that at the bottom the human sciences have far more to do with the practice of tact than with applying any kind of method. In this regard, I strongly concur with his ideas and his efforts for advancing human knowledge. His contributions in hermeneutics for its universality are praiseworthy and he sees me as a true defender of human science.

Gadamer’s all efforts were for universality and he kindled the spark of universal hermeneutical inspiration; he believed it consists in an inner speech where one is not unbound and cannot exceed in his expression. He takes it as an absolute principle and hermeneutic universality tells us that everything can be expressed in real language. Through the help of language, we can be capable to overcome all objections to its universality. Such objection must be capable of being formulated linguistically. He supposed everything as a language that being can be understood is language. And this was his claim that language was the universal horizon of hermeneutic experience. Including the claim that the hermeneutic experience itself was universal. According to him the very concept of thought or thought thinking itself was the part of philosophy. Thus he raised a question regarding this that how our natural view of the world, which is called the experience of the world is connected to the unknown authority that encounters the proclamations of science. Since the 17th century, the real task of philosophy was to conciliate this new kind of employment of cognitive and constructive capacities of a man with the totality of our experience of life. Now we see that this task of philosophy is expressing in various ways. It has found new ways and directions of expression compared to its past endeavors. In this connection, we also see the main concern of philosophy is this. Therefore we do not hesitate to say, and it is befitting here, that the language is also one of the elements of the “universal” of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Language for Gadamer is the fundamental mode of action of functioning of our being in the world and an all-encompassing form of the making of the world. This element we see in the world of creative arts e.g. in the perspective of the entire religious world of the ancient Greek we see the essential function of concrete art where the role of the artist was to express through it the divine in response to the gods. Through art, their religion of beauty experienced the divine. Even we don’t find in any nations religiously vital culture’s artist’s work had ever produced his work with no other intention excepting this aim that his people should receive the message what he wants to say or convey. That art in fact is a real representation of those people who live together. And what it says and presents must have a place in the common people. This should be the voice of their feelings and faiths in all aspects. In this way, we are strictly bound to say that through art we gain the world of artistic tradition along with so many worlds. Here the universal aim of art is being served which becomes successful in representing people in general. Before this there is no worth or meaning of any judgment and aesthetic consciousness, they are always secondary to the immediate truth-claim which is produced by the work of art. Through these judgments, we are being alienated from a work of art we are well acquainted with and more familiar with. How this happens so. This happens at that moment when we are not open to the immediate claim and withdraw ourselves to that which holds firmly or grasps us.

   Like art, we also see this universal element is present in history. While looking at the pages of historical consciousness last two hundred years record teaches us that there are some serious problems involved in its claim to historical objectivity. For example, when we get a chance to read History of Rome, written by Mommsen we come to know that he was alone who could have written it in true sense that we can identify the political situation in this historian organized the voices of the past in a meaningful way. We know from all the historical experience’s reality that while having mastery of historical method it does not be able to find its expression. Only one part of our actual experience can be expressed by historical science it cannot express our all experiences. According to professor Gadamer, we can find an element of truth in every caricature. Even in the case of the common person, we can say that who does not produce any new thing has also done this. The role of imagination is very important for scholars and this is a decisive function for him. Imagination naturally plays its hermeneutical role. It serves the ability to access the real and raises productive questions. Regarding this, only a person who has mastery over all methods of his science can be successful. Further, we may say that hermeneutical consciousness’ real power is our ability to see what is questionable. We just do not have to see only the artistic tradition of a people, historical tradition, or modern science’s principle in its hermeneutical preconditions. Instead of this, we have to take the whole of our experience, and then we can say in the real sense we have succeeded in our aim, in relating the science’s experience to our own universal and human experience of life. Through this now we can say that we have reached the fundamental level and we can call it the linguistic constitution of the world. It presents itself as the consciousness that is affected by history. The scholar – even the natural scientist is not fully free of society and custom and from all his environment’s possible factors. Precisely in his scientific experience providing fruitful ideas to him is not the laws of ironclad inference, as Helmholtz thought, but rather than being unforeseen constellations that kindle the spark of scientific inspiration. This we can see in Newton’s falling apple.

  The consciousness that is affected by history has its completion in linguistic. We can say that language, in its life and occurrence should not be considered as simply changing, and rather that is something that has a teleology operating within it. The process of formation of words, the means of expression in the language in saying certain things, all is not accidentally fixed or disuse. But instead of that, there is a definitive articulation of the world that builds up. This we always observe in children how they learn to speak and develop their language. Reaching this point, I can say in Gadamer’s words “what is manifest, I contend, is the real mode of operation of our whole human experience of the world.” Learning to speak is surely a phase of special productivity.

  In the light of the whole discussion, we can say, what has been described is the mode of the whole human experience of the world. Gadamer calls this experience hermeneutical. This discussion also shows us how the claim to universality is to be understood and this is appropriate to the hermeneutical dimension. In the end, we can say regarding this, that understanding is language-bound, and without it, there is no concept of universal hermeneutics for which Gadamer always struggled and ever seems adamant to achieve this. This is fundamental and essential to hermeneutics.

Well, for human science I would like to develop a methodology that would not be analogous to natural science’s method. I will provide certain arguments in support of this. What makes the human sciences into sciences can be understood were easily from the tradition of the concept of Bildung rather than from the modern idea of the scientific method. Through this concept, we become capable to know the circle of historical ideas. For rising to the universal Bildung is the task of man. It requires the sacrifice of particularity, immediacy, and restraint of one’s private desires and become free from its objectivity. The modern concept is insufficient for this requirement to define fully human sciences. For these humanistic studies, we have to turn to the humanistic tradition which resists modern science’s claims, and gains its new importance and significance in the contemporary world. Including this, we have to provide some historical background that how human sciences, contrary to natural sciences, played their positive role. In this connection, we shall also give some essential concrete examples from history for supporting our argument.

     It is evident that instead of mathematics humanistic studies are more important and play a pivotal role in the universality of hermeneutics. Here we can raise a question that how little can be achieved in this endeavor by the idea of method in the human sciences? While going through history we become aware of some realities regarding human sciences. In the 19th century, we see the development of human sciences which are under the dominancy of natural science. Thus looking at the history of the word Geisteswissenschaft we become familiar with the plural form of this word. We see that human sciences understand themselves similarly to natural sciences. And regarding this, we can say human sciences have their own logic. John Stuart was not of this idea and contrary to this he applied everywhere the inductive method considering it the only valid method in the field of human sciences. We see this method is basic to all experimental sciences not for human sciences. He also sought to apply this to the moral sciences. Human science has such capacity to establish conformities, similarities, and regularities to the law which can make it possible to predict individual phenomenon and processes. In the natural phenomenon, this aim ever cannot be achieved everywhere. The specific problem which is presented by human sciences to thought is that one cannot grasp their nature by the yardstick of regularity’s progressive knowledge. Through the process of natural science’s inductive procedure, the socio-historical experience cannot be raised to a science. In this way, natural science is limited to resolve the matter to grasp the concrete phenomenon as an instance of a universal rule. Even Helmholtz could not be successful to understand the nature of human sciences. Though he in his speech of 1862 emphasized the superior and human significance of the human sciences yet he did not give them a positive logical description. He distinguished between logical and artistic-instinctive induction. But his differentiation instead of logic was more psychological. These sciences use the inductive conclusion. We see in human science they reach their conclusions by an unconscious process. It requires intellectual capacities and a kind of tact as well. Including this, it requires also abounding memory. We see in J. G. Droysen who expressed the hope for the gaining stability and possibility of human sciences. They were in a chaotic movement at that time. Further, he intended that human sciences should be strongly established as a self-reliant and autonomous group of sciences. Even in the case of William Dilthey, who was much influenced by the empiricism of John Stuart Mill’s logic and the scientific method, was plunged into idealistic and romantic ideas in the concept of spirit (Geist). He often considered himself superior to British empiricism. For an ideal work, it requires seriousness, consistency, and continuous labor, and these qualities we see in Dilthey. His contribution is extended on a decade’s labor where he devotionally worked for the foundations of human sciences. Thus the model of the natural sciences immensely influenced Dilthey. Even at that time when he was struggling to provide justification for the methodological independence of the human sciences. I am given the task to develop a methodology for human sciences I would prefer to develop my method different from natural science and like William Dilthey will detach the methods of human sciences from the scientific model. But contrary to him, I would not develop it on the model of natural sciences, rather than I would develop a pure humanistic model which will encompass all the social and human life’s directions from its own method. Dilthey’s defense for epistemological independence of human sciences or method remains the same everywhere.

  Professor Gadamer doesn’t see in human sciences any method of their own. Hence he mentions the name of Helmholtz while asking questions to what extent method is important and other logical propositions of the human sciences are not more significant than inductive logic. I think that Helmholtz was quite right in doing justice to the human sciences when he was emphasizing authority and memory and in speaking of the psychological tact. That, here he did replace the conscious drawing of reflections. It was also asked that what the basis of this tact was. How was it acquired? The reason is given here that due to swiftly asked questions by human sciences they cannot be fitted in the modern concept of science; they are left for philosophy itself to resolve this problem. Helmholtz’s answer was neither satisfactory nor sufficient. In molding the idea of science and knowledge he was a follower of Kant. He founded his model of science and knowledge on the pattern of the natural sciences and sought the distinctive feature of the human sciences in the artistic element. Helmholtz’s given picture of work in the natural sciences is one-sided. It seems that he did not believe in so-called inspirations or sudden flashes of intuitions. But in the case of human freedom, this cannot be applied. Its world does not manifest the same absence as natural laws. Though we see human sciences regard themselves under the dominancy of the natural sciences, yet they have conveyed this message that they are humanism’s true representatives. We have excellent examples in German classicism which had not only brought new things in art, literature, and aesthetic criticism; it had also given the idea of humanity and new content. In the 21st century, scientific methods and technology have been dehumanized by their methodology and the hierarchy of their ideas. This methodology of natural science is working in limited forms and is not sufficient. Only human science’s method would be fruitful and real representative to lead someone to universality.